美國聯準會主席鮑威爾表示：會強力對抗通膨，直到任務完成

美國聯準會主席鮑威爾於8月26日在懷俄明州傑克森洞(Jackson Hole)舉行的全球央行年會中發表演說，內容聚焦在將強力對抗通膨，全球大多解讀為非常直白表明對抗通膨行對尚未結束。

鮑威爾演說中表示，聯準會公開市場委員會(FOMC)當前的重點，就是要讓通膨率回復到2%的目標值。穩定物價是聯準會的職責，也是經濟的基礎，沒有穩定的物價，經濟將不會發會任何功能，也無法維持勞動市場持續強勁，高通膨率將會是民眾最沉重的負擔。

而回復穩定物價需要花一段時間，而且必須要動用聯準會的工具，來讓供給與需求達到更好的平衡，而降低通膨的這段期間內，經濟成長可能會低於長期趨勢，勞動市場也可能會弱化。不過升息造成的經濟成長趨緩，勞動市場趨軟，將會把通膨率壓低，這會為家庭與企業帶來一些痛苦，這都是為降低通膨所需付出的代價。如果不能讓物價回復穩定，所承受的痛苦將會更大。

7月通膨率儘管已經有下降，但單一個月的好轉無法讓聯準會相信通膨正在下降中，聯準會的立場已經轉為必須要執行足夠的緊縮，讓通膨率回到2%。

聯準會對貨幣政策的思維與決策，是基於1970~1980年代高度且動盪的通膨期，與過去四分之一世紀偏低且穩定的通膨期，特別從其中擷取3項重要教訓。

1.央行能夠而且應該負擔責任，落實穩定且偏低的通膨環境；2.民眾對未來通膨的預期，可以在設定通膨路徑中發揮重要作用；3.聯準會必須讓通膨預期一直維持在低水準，直到任務完成。

Monetary Policy and Price Stability (August 26, 2022)

Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today.

At past Jackson Hole conferences, I have discussed broad topics such as the ever-changing structure of the economy and the challenges of conducting monetary policy under high uncertainty. Today, my remarks will be shorter, my focus narrower, and my message more direct.

The Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) overarching focus right now is to bring inflation back down to our 2 percent goal. Price stability is the responsibility of the Federal Reserve and serves as the bedrock of our economy. Without price stability, the economy does not work for anyone. In particular, without price stability, we will not achieve a sustained period of strong labor market conditions that benefit all. The burdens of high inflation fall heaviest on those who are least able to bear them.

Restoring price stability will take some time and requires using our tools forcefully to bring demand and supply into better balance. Reducing inflation is likely to require a sustained period of below-trend growth. Moreover, there will very likely be some softening of labor market conditions. While higher interest rates, slower growth, and softer labor market conditions will bring down inflation, they will also bring some pain to households and businesses. These are the unfortunate costs of reducing inflation. But a failure to restore price stability would mean far greater pain.

The U.S. economy is clearly slowing from the historically high growth rates of 2021, which reflected the reopening of the economy following the pandemic recession. While the latest economic data have been mixed, in my view our economy continues to show strong underlying momentum. The labor market is particularly strong, but it is clearly out of balance, with demand for workers substantially exceeding the supply of available workers. Inflation is running well above 2 percent, and high inflation has continued to spread through the economy. While the lower inflation readings for July are welcome, a single month's improvement falls far short of what the Committee will need to see before we are confident that inflation is moving down.

We are moving our policy stance purposefully to a level that will be sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent. At our most recent meeting in July, the FOMC raised the target range for the federal funds rate to 2.25 to 2.5 percent, which is in the Summary of Economic Projection's (SEP) range of estimates of where the federal funds rate is projected to settle in the longer run. In current circumstances, with inflation running far above 2 percent and the labor market extremely tight, estimates of longer-run neutral are not a place to stop or pause.

July's increase in the target range was the second 75 basis point increase in as many meetings, and I said then that another unusually large increase could be appropriate at our next meeting. We are now about halfway through the intermeeting period. Our decision at the September meeting will depend on the totality of the incoming data and the evolving outlook. At some point, as the stance of monetary policy tightens further, it likely will become appropriate to slow the pace of increases.

Restoring price stability will likely require maintaining a restrictive policy stance for some time. The historical record cautions strongly against prematurely loosening policy. Committee participants' most recent individual projections from the June SEP showed the median federal funds rate running slightly below 4 percent through the end of 2023. Participants will update their projections at the September meeting.

Our monetary policy deliberations and decisions build on what we have learned about inflation dynamics both from the high and volatile inflation of the 1970s and 1980s, and from the low and stable inflation of the past quarter-century. In particular, we are drawing on three important lessons.

The first lesson is that central banks can and should take responsibility for delivering low and stable inflation. It may seem strange now that central bankers and others once needed convincing on these two fronts, but as former Chairman Ben Bernanke has shown, both propositions were widely questioned during the Great Inflation period.1 Today, we regard these questions as settled. Our responsibility to deliver price stability is unconditional. It is true that the current high inflation is a global phenomenon, and that many economies around the world face inflation as high or higher than seen here in the United States. It is also true, in my view, that the current high inflation in the United States is the product of strong demand and constrained supply, and that the Fed's tools work principally on aggregate demand. None of this diminishes the Federal Reserve's responsibility to carry out our assigned task of achieving price stability. There is clearly a job to do in moderating demand to better align with supply. We are committed to doing that job.

The second lesson is that the public's expectations about future inflation can play an important role in setting the path of inflation over time. Today, by many measures, longer-term inflation expectations appear to remain well anchored. That is broadly true of surveys of households, businesses, and forecasters, and of market-based measures as well. But that is not grounds for complacency, with inflation having run well above our goal for some time.

If the public expects that inflation will remain low and stable over time, then, absent major shocks, it likely will. Unfortunately, the same is true of expectations of high and volatile inflation. During the 1970s, as inflation climbed, the anticipation of high inflation became entrenched in the economic decisionmaking of households and businesses. The more inflation rose, the more people came to expect it to remain high, and they built that belief into wage and pricing decisions. As former Chairman Paul Volcker put it at the height of the Great Inflation in 1979, "Inflation feeds in part on itself, so part of the job of returning to a more stable and more productive economy must be to break the grip of inflationary expectations."2

One useful insight into how actual inflation may affect expectations about its future path is based in the concept of "rational inattention."3 When inflation is persistently high, households and businesses must pay close attention and incorporate inflation into their economic decisions. When inflation is low and stable, they are freer to focus their attention elsewhere. Former Chairman Alan Greenspan put it this way: "For all practical purposes, price stability means that expected changes in the average price level are small enough and gradual enough that they do not materially enter business and household financial decisions."4

Of course, inflation has just about everyone's attention right now, which highlights a particular risk today: The longer the current bout of high inflation continues, the greater the chance that expectations of higher inflation will become entrenched.

That brings me to the third lesson, which is that we must keep at it until the job is done. History shows that the employment costs of bringing down inflation are likely to increase with delay, as high inflation becomes more entrenched in wage and price setting. The successful Volcker disinflation in the early 1980s followed multiple failed attempts to lower inflation over the previous 15 years. A lengthy period of very restrictive monetary policy was ultimately needed to stem the high inflation and start the process of getting inflation down to the low and stable levels that were the norm until the spring of last year. Our aim is to avoid that outcome by acting with resolve now.

These lessons are guiding us as we use our tools to bring inflation down. We are taking forceful and rapid steps to moderate demand so that it comes into better alignment with supply, and to keep inflation expectations anchored. We will keep at it until we are confident the job is done.

(以下為Google 翻譯)

感謝您今天有機會在這裡發言。

在過去的傑克遜霍爾會議上，我討論了廣泛的話題，例如不斷變化的經濟結構以及在高度不確定性下實施貨幣政策的挑戰。今天，我的發言會更短，我的焦點會更窄，我的信息會更直接。

聯邦公開市場委員會 (FOMC) 目前的首要任務是將通脹率降至 2% 的目標。價格穩定是美聯儲的責任，是我們經濟的基石。沒有價格穩定，經濟對任何人都不起作用。特別是，如果沒有物價穩定，我們將無法實現長期的、有利於所有人的強勁勞動力市場條件。高通脹的負擔落在最無力承受的人身上。

恢復價格穩定需要一些時間，並且需要強有力地使用我們的工具來使供需達到更好的平衡。降低通脹可能需要持續一段低於趨勢的增長。此外，勞動力市場狀況很可能會出現一些疲軟。雖然更高的利率、增長放緩和疲軟的勞動力市場條件會降低通脹，但它們也會給家庭和企業帶來一些痛苦。這些都是降低通脹的不幸代價。但未能恢復價格穩定將意味著更大的痛苦。

美國經濟明顯從 2021 年的歷史高增長率放緩，這反映了大流行性衰退後經濟的重新開放。儘管最新的經濟數據喜憂參半，但在我看來，我們的經濟繼續顯示出強勁的潛在動力。勞動力市場特別強勁，但顯然失衡，對工人的需求大大超過了可用工人的供應。通貨膨脹率遠高於 2%，高通貨膨脹率繼續在經濟中蔓延。儘管 7 月份的通脹數據較低是受歡迎的，但在我們確信通脹正在下降之前，單月的改善遠未達到委員會需要看到的水平。

我們正在有目的地將我們的政策立場調整到足以限制通脹率至 2% 的水平。在我們 7 月份的最近一次會議上，FOMC 將聯邦基金利率的目標區間上調至 2.25% 至 2.5%，這屬於經濟預測摘要 (SEP) 對聯邦基金利率預計穩定的估計範圍內運行時間越長。在當前情況下，通脹率遠高於 2%，勞動力市場極度緊張，對長期中性的估計不應停止或暫停。

7 月份目標範圍的上調是在許多會議中第二次上調 75 個基點，我當時說，在我們的下一次會議上，再一次大幅上調可能是合適的。我們現在大約在會議期間進行了一半。我們在 9 月會議上的決定將取決於傳入數據的總量和不斷變化的前景。在某個時候，隨著貨幣政策立場進一步收緊，放慢加息步伐可能會變得合適。

恢復價格穩定可能需要在一段時間內保持限制性政策立場。歷史記錄強烈警告不要過早放鬆政策。委員會參與者對 6 月 SEP 的最新個人預測顯示，到 2023 年底，聯邦基金利率中值將略低於 4%。參與者將在 9 月的會議上更新他們的預測。

我們的貨幣政策審議和決策建立在我們從 1970 年代和 1980 年代的高通脹和波動的通脹以及過去 25 年低而穩定的通脹中所了解的通脹動態之上。特別是，我們吸取了三個重要的教訓。

第一個教訓是中央銀行可以而且應該為實現低而穩定的通脹負責。現在看來，央行行長和其他人曾經需要在這兩個方面令人信服，但正如前主席本·伯南克所表明的那樣，這兩個主張在大通脹時期都受到了廣泛質疑。1今天，我們認為這些問題已經解決。我們實現價格穩定的責任是無條件的。確實，當前的高通脹是一種全球現象，世界上許多經濟體都面臨著與美國一樣高或更高的通脹。在我看來，美國目前的高通脹也是需求旺盛和供應受限的產物，而美聯儲的工具主要針對總需求起作用，這也是事實。這一切都不會削弱美聯儲執行我們分配的實現價格穩定任務的責任。顯然，在緩和需求以更好地與供應保持一致方面有一項工作要做。我們致力於完成這項工作。

第二個教訓是，公眾對未來通脹的預期可以在設定通脹路徑中發揮重要作用。今天，從許多方面來看，長期通脹預期似乎仍然很好地錨定。對家庭、企業和預測者的調查以及基於市場的措施的調查大致如此。但這並不是自滿的理由，因為通脹在一段時間內遠高於我們的目標。

如果公眾預計通脹會隨著時間的推移保持低位和穩定，那麼在沒有重大衝擊的情況下，它很可能會。不幸的是，對高通脹和波動的預期也是如此。在 1970 年代，隨著通脹攀升，高通脹的預期在家庭和企業的經濟決策中變得根深蒂固。通脹上升得越多，人們就越預期它會保持在高位，他們將這種信念融入到工資和定價決策中。正如前主席保羅沃爾克在 1979 年大通脹高峰時所說的那樣，“通脹在一定程度上是自食其果，因此恢復更穩定和更有生產力的經濟的部分工作必須是打破通脹預期的束縛。

關於實際通脹如何影響對其未來路徑的預期的一個有用的見解是基於“理性疏忽”的概念。3當通脹持續居高不下時，家庭和企業必須密切關注並將通脹納入其經濟決策。當通貨膨脹率低且穩定時，他們可以更自由地將注意力集中在其他地方。前主席艾倫·格林斯潘是這樣說的：“實際上，價格穩定意味著平均價格水平的預期變化足夠小，而且足夠漸進，不會實質性地影響到企業和家庭的財務決策。

當然，通脹目前幾乎所有人都在關注，這凸顯了當今的一個特殊風險：當前一輪高通脹持續的時間越長，通脹上升預期變得根深蒂固的可能性就越大。

這讓我想到了第三課，那就是我們必須堅持下去，直到工作完成。歷史表明，隨著高通脹在工資和價格設定中變得更加根深蒂固，降低通脹的就業成本可能會延遲增加。在 1980 年代初期成功的沃爾克反通脹是在過去 15 年多次嘗試降低通脹率失敗之後。最終需要長期的非常嚴格的貨幣政策來遏制高通脹，並開始將通脹降至去年春天之前的低水平和穩定水平。我們的目標是通過立即採取行動來避免這種結果。

當我們使用我們的工具來降低通貨膨脹時，這些經驗教訓正在指導我們。我們正在採取有力而迅速的措施來緩和需求，以便更好地與供應保持一致，並保持通脹預期穩定。我們將堅持下去，直到我們有信心完成工作。